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Abstract. This paper studies privacy-preserving weighted federated learn-
ing within the oracle-aided multi-party computation (MPC) framework.
The contribution of this paper mainly comprises the following three-fold:
– In the first fold, a new notion which we call weighted federated learn-
ing (wFL) is introduced and formalized inspired by McMahan et al.’s
seminal paper. The weighted federated learning concept formalized
in this paper differs from that presented in McMahan et al.’s pa-
per since both addition and multiplication operations are executed
over ciphers in our model while these operations are executed over
plaintexts in McMahan et al.’s model.
– In the second fold, an oracle-aided MPC solution for computing
weighted federated learning is formalized by decoupling the secu-
rity of federated learning systems from that of underlying multi-
party computations. Our decoupling formulation may benefit ma-
chine learning developers to select their best security practices from
the state-of-the-art security tool sets;
– In the third fold, a concrete solution to the weighted federated learn-
ing problem is presented and analysed. The security of our imple-
mentation is guaranteed by the security composition theorem assum-
ing that the underlying multiplication algorithm is secure against
honest-but-curious adversaries.
Keywords: Privacy-preserving, weighted federated learning, Oracle-Aided
multi-party computation
1 Introduction
The concept of Federated Learning (FL) first introduced by McMahan et
al. [1] is a decoupling of model training from the need for direct access
to the raw training data. A formal definition of Federated Learning later
has been formalized by Qiang Yang et al.[2], where datasets defined in
the FL framework are categorized as horizontal, vertical and hybrid types.
Roughly speaking, in the horizontal FL, datasets of different organizations
have same feature space but little intersection on the sample space [3,4];
In the vertical FL, datasets of different organization have same sample
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space (entity) but little intersection on the feature space; In the hybrid
FL, feature spaces and sample spaces are overlapped in an non-negligible
level [5,6]. We refer to the reader [7,8,9,10,11](and the references therein)
for further reference.
1.1 The motivation problem
Going through the FederatedAveraging algorithm presented in [1] that
works over the horizontal datasets, we know that each client k locally
computes nk number of local data samples for the local model w
k
t+1 at
the current (t+1)-round. The parameters nk and w
k
t+1 are then sent to the
global server who in turn, computes the weighted average of the resulting
model wt+1 ←
∑K
k=1
nk
n w
k
t+1 where K is the number of clients and n =
n1 + · · ·+ nK . From the client point of views, it is desirable both nk and
wkt+1 are well protected since the variables contain sensitive information
closely related to the client k. In fact, a demonstrative attack sketched
in [1] shows that if the update is the total gradient of the loss on all of
local data, and the features are a sparse bag-of-words, then the non-zero
gradient reveals exactly which words the user has entered on the device.
Since nk is the number of local data samples for the local model w
k
t+1,
we can map these parameters in the context of FederatedAveraging to the
standard notion of weight and feature pair (nk, w
k
t+1) in the context of
machine learning, where nk stands for weight and w
k
t+1 stands for feature
at the (t + 1)-round. By [nk] (resp. [w
k
t+1]), we denote an encryption of
nk (resp. w
k
t+1). The selection of the underlying encryption scheme that
is used to encrypt nk and w
k
t+1 is flexible which can be a secret shar-
ing scheme (either Shamir secret sharing or additively secret sharing)
based encryption or a homomorphic cryptosystem (e.g., additively ho-
momorphic encryption or multiplicative encryption or (somewhat) fully
homomorphic encryption).
A FederatedAveraging algorithm that works over ciphertexts is called
weighted federated learning (wFL) since both nk and w
k
t+1 are encrypted
and thus are unknown to the global server. We stress that the notion
of FederatedAveraging algorithm works over plaintexts while the notion
of wFL works over ciphertexts. A naive solution to the wFL could be
that, to keep nk and w
k
t+1 private, the client k could first encrypt nk and
wkt+1 and then send the resulting ciphertexts [nk] and [w
k
t+1] to the global
server. The global server then performs the following computations over
ciphers:
– Computing the weighted aggregating [WeightedAggregating] = [n1]
[w1t+1] + · · · + [nK ][wkt+1];
– Computing the summation over ([n1], · · · , [nK ]) such that [n] = [n1]
+ · · · + [nK ];
– Decrypting [n] and [WeightedAggregating] to obtain the correspond-
ing plaintexts of parameters n and [WeightedAggregating];
– Updating FederatedAveraging = [WeightedAggregating]/n.
Since the suggested solution to wFL comprises of basic addition and
multiplication arithmetic operations defined over ciphers, it follows that
the state-of-the-art secure multi-party computation (MPC) platforms or
secure machine learning (ML) platforms can be applied to solve wFL
problem. However, a direct application of additive or multiplicative or
(somewhat) fully-homomorphic encryption to the above problem could
result in an inefficient solution since in the federated learning scenario,
the number of total sample data of an application is big (an experiment
for 100 clients each with 600 data samples has been demonstrated by
McMahan et al. [1]).
Recall that the challenging of MPC based on SPDZ framework [12,13,14,15,16]
is to generate Beaver triple set while MPC based on additive secret shar-
ing framework [18,19] is to generate zero-summation triple set, efficiently
and securely. Three methods are known so far to generate Beaver triple
or zero-summation triple: 1) somewhat fully-homomorphic based solution
(e.g., the Scale-Mamba 1); 2) Trusted Third Party based software solu-
tion(e.g., ShareMind 2, OpenMined 3); and 3)Enclave based hardware
solution (e.g., Facebook CrypTen 4, Google Tensorflow 5). Among the
three suggested methods, the trusted third party based solution could be
more suitable for weighted federated learning solutions, where each client
plays role of the trusted part to distribute its randomness and data to
the distributed servers.
1.2 This work
Generalizing the above observation, we are able to introduce the notion
of weighted federated learning defined over cipher space, which is stated
informally below:
Weighted Federated Learning (wFL) : Let P1, · · · , Pm be m clients.
Each client Pi has its inpi =([wi], [fi]), where ([wi], [fi]) stands for a pair
1 https://homes.esat.kuleuven.be/nsmart/SCALE/
2 https://sharemind.cyber.ee/
3 https://www.openmined.org/
4 https://github.com/facebookresearch/CrypTen
5 https://www.tensorflow.org/
of encrypted weight [wi] and feature [fi]. W.l.o.g, we simply assume that
both wi and fi are integers. Let WA(inp1, · · · , inpm) = 1/([w1] + · · · +
[wm]) × ([w1][f1] + · · · + [wm][fm]) be a machine learning mechanism
maintained and managed by a global server for conducting the weighted
aggregating algorithm WA whose input is (inp1, · · · , inpm) and output is
1/([w1] + · · ·+ [wm])× ([w1][f1] + · · ·+ [wm][fm]).
Enhanced wFL : Suppose that the global server wishes to be convinced
that the size of data used to compute [fi], is no less than the specified
threshold which is managed and maintained by the global server. For ex-
ample, to reducing the numbers of session establishment between clients
and the serve, the global server wishes a qualified client should have min-
imum 500 data samples. The enhanced problem allows the global server
first check the condition [Threshold] > [ni] and in case that the condition
is satisfied, the qualified clients and the global server are then engaged in
an execution of wFL. Since a private reduction from the enhanced wFL to
the wFL assuming assuming the enhanced wFL is provided secure com-
parison functionality, we will focus on the solution to wFL throughout
the paper.
The challenging and solution : As noted above, there are known
solutions to the basic addition and multiplication arithmetic operations
defined over ciphers and the evolution of existing algorithms and proto-
cols for implementing arithmetic operations defined over ciphers leaves us
a challenging task to evaluate the security of a federated learning system
leveraging on the evolving implementations. For example, in ShareMind,
the multiplication operator based on the Du and Atallah’s method [17]
was replaced by a newly developed zero-summation triple mechanism [18,19].
To solve this challenging problem, we decouple the security of the weighted
federated learning from that of the underlying arithmetic operations by
viewing a known implementation of arithmetic operation, or a protocol
defined over ciphers as an oracle-aided computation; We then evaluate
the security of weighted federated learning system in the protocol com-
position model. Our decoupling formulation may benefit machine learning
developers to select their best security practices from the state-of-the-art
security tool sets.
Summary : In summary, the main contribution of this paper consists
of the following three parts: in the first part, a new notion which we
call weighted federated learning is introduced and formalized inspired
by McMahan et al’s seminal paper; in the second part, an oracle-aided
MPC solution for computing weighted federated learning is formalized by
decoupling the security of federated learning systems from that of under-
lying multi-party computations; in the third part, a concrete solution to
the weighted federated learning problem is presented and analysed. We
are able to show that our protocol is secure against semi-honest adversary
if the underlying multiplication algorithm is secure against honest-but-
curious adversary.
The roadmap : The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In sec-
tion 2, syntax and security definition for weighted federated learning is
introduced and formlaized; An efficient implementation and security proof
are presented in Section 3. We conclude our work in Section 4.
2 Syntax and security definition
In this section, we will provide a formal definition for weighted Federated
Learning and then define the security of wFL within the oracle-aided
multi-party computation framework.
2.1 Syntax of weighted federated learning
Definition 1. A weighted Federated Learning protocol (wFL) consists of
a group of clients (c1, · · · , cm), a global Federated Learning server sFL and
a group of computing servers P1 · · · , Pn. Each client ci holds a weight and
feature pair (xi, yi) ∈ Z∗p × Z∗p (p is a prime number) which is additively
shared among servers where Pj holds (xi,j , yi,j) and xi = xi,1 + · · ·+ xi,n
and yi =yi,1 + · · · + yi,n. By [xi], we denote a pair of random shares
(xi,1, · · · , xi,n) and [yi] = (yi,1, · · · , yi,n) among Pj (j = 1, · · · , n). The
global federated learning server sFL defines a machine learning algorithm
WA whose input is ([x1], [y1]), · · · , ([xn], [yn]) and output is
∑K
k=1[xi] ×
[yi].
2.2 Security definition of weighted federated learning
The security of wFL protocol is formalized in the context of an oracle-
aided secure multi-party computation (MPC) which in essence, is a de-
coupling of machine learning algorithm from the need for MPC that may
benefit machine learning developers to select their best security practices
from the state-of-the-art security tool sets. We briefly describe the nota-
tions and notions related to oracle-aided secure multi-party computation
below and refer to the reader [20,21]) for more details.
Let f : ({0, 1}∗)m → ({0, 1}∗)m be an m-ary functionality, where
fi(x1, · · · , xm) denotes the ith element of f(x1, · · · , xm). Let [m]= {1, · · · ,m},
and for I ∈ {i1, · · · , it} ⊆ [m], we let fI(x1, · · · , xm) denote the subse-
quence fi1(x1, · · · , xm), · · · , fit(x1, · · · , xm). Let Π be an m-party proto-
col for computing f . The view of the i-th party during an execution of
Π on x:= (x1, · · · , xm) is denoted by ViewΠi (x). For I = {i1, · · · , it}, we
let ViewΠI (x):= (I, View
Π
i1
(x), · · · , ViewΠit (x)). In case f is a determinis-
tic m-ary functionality, we say Π privately computes f if there exists a
probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm denoted S, such that for every
I ⊆ [m], it holds that S(I, (xi1 , · · · , xit), fI(x)) is computationally in-
distinguishable with ViewΠI (x). In general case, S(I, (xi1 , · · · , xit), fI(x),
f(x)) is computationally indistinguishable with ViewΠI ((x), f(x)).
An oracle-aided protocol is a protocol augmented by a pair of oracle
types, per each party. An oracle-call step is defined as follows: a party
writes an oracle request on its own oracle tape and then sends it to the
other parties; in response, each of the other parties writes its query on its
own oracle tape and responds to the first party with an oracle call mes-
sage; at this point the oracle is invoked and the oracle answer is written
by the oracle on the ready-only oracle tape of each party. An oracle-aided
protocol is said to privately reduce g to f if it securely computes g when
using the oracle-functionality f . In such a case, we say that g is securely
reducible to f .
Definition 2. An multiplication-oracle aided wFL is privacy-preserving
if wFL is privately reducible to the multiplication functionality.
Notice that we do not provide the privacy-preserving reduction to the
addition oracle since the underlying data sharing scheme is an additively
secret sharing.
3 The implementation and security proof
In this section, a concrete solution of wFL based on the additive data
sharing with the help of the zero-summation technique defined over three-
server setting is presented and analyzed. The security of our implementa-
tion is derived from the security composition theorem assuming that the
underlying ShareMind Multiplication algorithm is secure against honest-
but-curious adversaries.
3.1 The implementation
Our implementation consists of following steps: the data splitting, the
resharing, the addition and the multiplication. Each of steps is depicted
in details below:
The data splitting Suppose a wFL client Alice holds private data [x]
and [y] locally. W.l.o.g., we assume that there are three MPC servers
managed and maintained by independent computing service providers
such as FL auditor (P1), FL insurance company P2) and FL client associ-
ation (P3). We assume that there is a secure (private and authenticated)
channel between client Alice and each of FL service providers. This as-
sumption is standard and can be easily implemented under the standard
PKI assumption. For simplicity, we assume that x, y ∈ Z∗p , where p is
a suitable large prime number (e.g., |p| =64). The splitting procedure is
defined below
– Alice selects x1, x2 ∈ Z∗p uniformly at random, and then sends x1 to
P1, x2 to P2;
– Alice computes x3 = x− x2 − x3 mod p and sends x3 to P3.
The splitting of the data x is defined by [x] = (x1, x2, x3) (as usual, a
random split of data is also called an encryption of that data). Similarly,
an encryption of y is defined by [y] = (y1, y2, y3), where Pi holds yi (i=
1,2,3).
The resharing A refreshing procedure is called whenever a multiplica-
tion operation is executed. The refreshing procedure is defined among P1
(with input x1), P2 (with input x2 ) and P3 (with input x3) such that x
= x1 + x2 + x3:
– P1 selects r1 ∈ Z∗p uniformly at random and sends r1 to P2 via a
pre-defined secure channel;
– Similarly, P2 (resp. P3) selects r2 ∈ Z∗p (resp. r3 ∈U Z∗p) uniformly
at random and sends r2 (resp. r3) to P3 (resp. P1) via a pre-defined
secure channel;
– P1 locally computes σ1 = r1 - r3 mod p and x
′
1 = x1 + σ1 mod p; P2
locally computes σ2 = r2 - r1 mod p and x
′
2 = x2 + σ2 mod p and P3
locally computes σ3 = r3 - r2 mod p and x
′
2 = x2 + σ3 mod p.
A refresh of [x] is denoted by [x′] = ([x′1], [x′2], [x′3]). One can verify that
x′1 + x′2 + x′3 mod p = x1 + x2 + x3 mod p.
The addition Suppose Pi holds shares of xi and yi. Pi locally computes
zi = xi + yi mod p and then sends zi to the FL global server who computes
z1 + z2 + z3 mod p and thus gets the value of addition x+ y mod p.
The multiplication On input (xi, yi), each participant Pi jointly run
the resharing protocol to get (x′i, y
′
i) (i = 1, 2, 3). The role of resharing
protocol plays a one-time padding of shares. Pi then sends its shares
(x′i, y
′
i) to Pi mod 3+1. Then P1 computes z1 = (x
′
1y
′
1 +x
′
1y
′
3 +x
′
3y
′
1) mod p;
P2 computes z2 = (x
′
2y
′
2 + x
′
2y
′
1 + x
′
1y
′
2) mod p and P3 computes z3 =
x′3y′3 + x′3y′2 + x′2y′3 mod p. One can verify that z1 + z2 + z3 mod p =
[x][y] mod p.
Putting things together Recall that [n] =([n1], · · · , [nK ]) and [w]
=([w1], · · · , [wK ]), where [nk] = (nk,1, nk,2, nk,3) and [wk] = (wk,1, wk,2,
wk,3). The (nk,1, wk,1) is a secret share held by P1, (nk,2, wk,2) is a share
held by P2 and P3 holds (nk,3, wk,3) for k = 1, · · · ,K. Applying the ad-
dition and multiplication operations described above, the wFL is solved.
3.2 The proof of security
Theorem 1. Let gwFL be a weighted Federated Learning functionality
defined in the three-server framework. Let ΠgwFL|fmult be an oracle-aided
protocol that privately reduces gwFL to fmult and Π
fmult be a protocol pri-
vately computes fmult. Suppose gwFL is privately reducible to fmult and that
there exists a protocol for privately computing fmult, then there exists a
protocol for privately computing gwFL.
Proof. We construct a protocol Π for computing gwFL. That is, we replace
each invocation of the oracle fmult by an execution of protocol Π
fmult . Note
that in the semi-honest model, the steps executed ΠgwFL|fmult inside Π are
independent the actual execution of Πfmult and depend only on the output
of Πfmult .
For each i = 1, 2, 3, let S
gwFL|fmult
i and S
fmult
i be the corresponding sim-
ulators for the view of party Pi. We construct a simulator Si for the view
of party Pi in Π. That is, we first run S
gwFL|fmult
i and obtain the simulated
view of party Pi in Π
gwFL|fmult . This simulated view includes queries made
by Pi and the corresponding answers from the oracle. Invoking S
fmult
i on
each of partial query-answer (qi, ai), we fill in the view of party Pi for
each of these interaction of Sfmulti . The rest of the proof is to show that Si
indeed generates a distribution that is indistinguishable from the view of
Pi in an actual execution of Π.
Let Hi be a hybrid distribution represents the view of Pi in an exe-
cution of ΠgwFL|fmult that is augmented by the corresponding invocation
of Sfmulti . That is, for each query-answer pair (qi, ai), we augment its view
with Sfmulti . It follows that Hi represents the execution of protocol Π with
the exception that Πfmult is replaced by simulated transcripts. We will
show that
– the distribution between Hi and Π are computationally indistinguish-
able: notice that the distributions of Hi and Π differ Π
fmult and Sfmulti
which is computationally indistinguishable assuming that Πfmult se-
curely computes fmult.
– the distribution between Hi and Si are computationally indistinguish-
able: notice that the distributions between (ΠgwFL|fmult , Sfmulti ) is com-
putationally indistinguishable from (Si
gwFL|fmult , Sfmulti ). The distribu-
tion (Si
gwFL|fmult , Sfmulti ) defines Si. That means Hi and Si are compu-
tationally indistinguishable.
Corollary 1. Assuming that the underlying multiplication algorithm pre-
sented in [18] is secure against honest-but-curious adversary, our imple-
mentation is secure against the same adversarial type.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, a new notion which we call weighted federated learning
problem is introduced and formalized. The security of wFL is defined
within the Oracle-aided MPC framework. An efficient solution to the
wFL is implemented within the framework of ShareMind and we are able
to show that if the underlying multiplication algorithm is secure against
honest-but-curious adversary, then our implementation is secure against
the same adversarial type.
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